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NOTES
United States v. Jamieson: The
Role of the Canadian Charter in
Canadian Extradition Law
James D. McCann*
Introduction
On November 13, 1986, police arrested Daniel Jamieson in Farmington,
Michigan, for selling 273 grams of a cocaine mixture to an undercover
officer.' Charged with cocaine trafficking, Jamieson was released on bail
and scheduled for trial in April of 1987.2 When Jamieson failed to appear
at his trial, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.3 Jamieson had
fled to Canada.4 On September 12, 1990, American and Canadian authori-
* J.D., Cornell, 1997; B.A., Rutgers College, 1994.
1. See United States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 271 (Que. Ct. App. 1994).
2. See id. at 272. Jamieson had an accomplice, David Schultz. Police charged that
Jamieson and Schultz "did manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or
deliver 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine," in violation of MicH.
CoMP. LAws § 333.7401 (1992). People v. Schultz, 172 Mich. App. 674, 432 N.W.2d
742, 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). MicH. CoMP. LAws § 333.7401 reads:
(1) Except as authorized by this article, a person shall not manufacture, deliver,
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance ....
(2) A person who violates this section as to:
(a) A controlled substance classified in schedule I or 2 which is either a
narcotic drug [such as cocaine] or described in section 7214(a)(iv) and ....
(ii) Which is in an amount of 225 grams or more, but less than 650
grams of any mixture containing that controlled substance is guilty of a
felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 20 years nor more than
30 years.
Jamieson negotiated the "buy" with the undercover officer. See Schultz, 432 N.W.2d at
743. The prosecution contended that Schultz aided and abetted Jamieson in the drug
sale by knowingly delivering the cocaine to Jamieson, and by being present during the
sale in the room adjoining that in which the sale took place, in "plain view" of drug
paraphernalia. See id. at 743, 744-747. The undercover officer exchanged $20,000 for
the cocaine. SeeJamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 272. See infra note 199 for further discussion
of Schultz's sentencing.
3. See United States v. Jamieson, 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 463 (Que. Ct. App. 1992).
4. See id.
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ties arrested Jamieson where he worked as a bouncer 5 in Montreal, Que-
bec, on a warrant issued pursuant to proceedings initiated by the United
States against Jamieson under the Canadian Extradition Act.6 Nearly six
years of proceedings followed, as Jamieson attempted to halt the extradi-
tion process. 7
Jamieson temporarily succeeded in his second appearance before the
Quebec Court of Appeal. In a split decision, a three-judge panel ruled that
the Minister of Justice's8 extradition order violated section 7 of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,9 reasoning that the imposition of a
twenty-year minimum prison sentence with no chance of parole upon a
first-time drug offender with no criminal record was contrary to "funda-
mental justice."10 But Jamieson's success was short-lived. The Supreme
Court of Canada rejected this interpretation of section 7, unanimously
reversing the Quebec Court of Appeal and dismissing Jamieson's petition
for habeas corpus relief"' In March of 1996, almost ten years after his
initial arrest, Jamieson was returned to Michigan to face trial. 12
Jamieson presents the question: given Michigan's sentencing regime,
what constraints does the Charter place upon the Canadian Minister of
Justice's discretionary ability to order Jamieson's extradition?' 3 This Note
scrutinizes the 1994 Quebec Court of Appeal'sJamieson decision, as well as
5. See Anne Svardson, Quebec Court Finds a U.S. Drug Sentence Shocking to Cana-
dian Sensibility, WASH. PosT, Sept. 3, 1994, at A13.
6. SeeJamieson, 73 C.C.C.3d at 462. Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. E-23 (1995)
(Can.) [hereinafter Extradition Act].
7. See generally United States v. Jamieson, S.C.M. 500-27-015433-909 (Que. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (ordering Jamieson's committal for extradition), affd sub nom. Jamieson v.
Warden of Parthenais, S.C.M. 500-36-000019-912 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1991) (dismissingJam-
ieson's habeas corpus appeal from the committal order), afj'd sub nom. United States v.
Jamieson, 73 C.C.C.3d 460, (Que. Ct. App. 1992), leave for further rev. denied S.C.C.
22879 (1992); United States v. Jamieson, S.C.M. 500-36-000086-937 (Que. Sup. Ct.
1993) (dismissing Jamieson's habeas corpus petition to the Minister of Justice's surren-
der order), rev'd 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 271 (Que. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd 104 C.C.C.3d 575
(Can. 1996).
See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 76 and 80 for the substance and proce-
dure of habeas corpus petitions in extradition proceedings.
8. The Minister of Justice holds a cabinet-level position.
9. CAN. CONsT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms) [hereinafter The Charter]. The Charter is similar to the U.S. Constitution's Bill of
Rights, protecting against double jeopardy (Charter § 11(h), U.S. CONST. amend. 5),
forced self incrimination (Charter § 11(c), U.S. CONST. amend. 5), and cruel or (and)
unusual punishment (Charter § 12, U.S. CONST. amend. 8). Section 7 has no literal
analog within the Bill of Rights, although it does suggest the jurisprudential doctrine of
substantive due process. It reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice."
10. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 271.
11. See United States v. Jamieson, 104 C.C.C.3d 575, 576 (Can. 1996).
12. See Brian Harmon, Oakland Man Extradited from Canada Faces 20 Years, DErRorr
NEws, Mar. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
13. The Jamieson majority on the Quebec Court of Appeal framed the issue as
"whether the Minister's decision to surrender Uamieson] violates the principles of fun-
damental justice within the meaning of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms." United States vJamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 271 (Que. Ct. App. 1994).
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the reversal that followed from the Supreme Court of Canada. Part I exam-
ines the general role and rules of extradition, as well as the historical devel-
opment of extradition arrangements between Canada and the United
States. Part II summarizes the rules and mechanisms that govern the extra-
dition of fugitives from Canada to the United States. Part III describes the
role of the habeas corpus petition in Canadian extradition proceedings.
Part IV conducts an overview of the jurisprudence concerning the Charter
and Canadian extradition practice. Part V analyzes Jamieson in light of
Parts I, II, III, and IV. The Note concludes that the Supreme Court of Can-
ada correctly decided Jamieson, both as a matter of policy and as a matter
of law.
I. The Historical Development of the United States-Canadian
Extradition Relationship
A. The Role and Rules of Extradition
Extradition has been defined as "the surrender by one state, at the request
of another, of a person who is accused or has been convicted of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of the requesting state."14 Such a proce-
dure benefits both countries. The state requesting extradition is able to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused lawbreaker' 5 and strength-
ens its law enforcement agencies by reducing the possibility that convicted
or suspected criminals might escape capture and prosecution by fleeing to
another country.' 6 The state extraditing the prisoner prevents itself from
becoming a haven for criminals,17 deters other foreign criminals from seek-
ing protection within its borders,' 8 and may benefit from future reciproc-
14. ANNE WARNER LA FoREsT, LA FoR.sT's EXTRADMON To AND FROM CANADA 1
(1991).
15. The interest that a state has in trying an accused criminal was stressed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in United States v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d 193, 217 (Can.
1989): "Extradition thus shares one of the basic objectives of all criminal prosecutions:
to discover the truth in respect of the charges brought against the accused in a proper
hearing."
16. Cf. LA FoREsr, supra note 14, at 15. See also, Worldwide Review of Status of U.S.
Extradition Treaties and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearing Before House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 2 (1987) (statement of Ms. Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal
Adviser, Dept. of State) "Extradition of such [modem] criminals to a country with crimi-
nal charges pending against them becomes an important part of international coopera-
tion in anti-criminal activity." Id.
17. See LA FoREsT, supra note 14, at 15. The fear that Canada might become a safe
haven for U.S. criminals was raised in response to Jamieson. Svardson, supra note 5, at
A13. "The appeals court decision ... has unleashed concerns that Canada could attract
more Americans fleeing their stricter judicial system." Id.
The fear of criminals seeking asylum was a motivating force behind the first Canadian
extradition statute, the stated purpose of which was the "apprehending and delivering
up of felons [who] seek an asylum in Upper Canada." An Act Respecting the Apprehen-
sion of Fugitive Offenders from Foreign Countries, and Delivering Them Up to Justice, 3
Will. 4, ch. 6 (1833) (Eng.), in SIR EowARD CLARKE, A TREATSE UPON THE LAw OF ExTRA-
DrTON 93-94 (1903) [hereinafter The Act of 1833].
18. I.A. SHEARER, ExTrRADrTON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1971).
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ity. 19 Finally, as the most likely location of witnesses, evidence, and the
people with the strongest interest in trying an alleged criminal, the request-
ing country is the best place to try the accused.20
On a purely practical level, some states restrict the extradition of fugi-
tives by requiring reciprocity with the requesting state.2 1 Concerns related
to reciprocity also underlie many of the substantive prerequisites to extra-
dition embodied in extradition treaties.2 2 Nevertheless, human rights
issues have occupied a place of increasing prominence in extradition law
over the past fifty years.23 Many common law nations require an extradi-
tion treaty with the requesting country before any extradition may take
place,24 barring the surrender of a fugitive to a nation whose political or
criminal justice systems do not share such values with the requested coun-
try for the conclusion of a treaty.25 Extradition is also typically refused for
"political" offenses 2 6 and when the person to be extradited would face
double jeopardy.2 7 States may restrict the extradition of their own nation-
als,28 and states that do not have the death penalty often place limitations
on the extradition of a person facing a possible death sentence. 29
B. The Developing U.S.-Canadian Extradition Relationship
The United States and Canada have steadily liberalized their extradition
19. Reciprocity is essential to extradition, and "[w]ithin treaties, reciprocity is
embodied in the mutuality of obligations and undertakings of the parties." I.M. CHERIF
BAssiouN, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 321 (1987).
See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 57. It sets extradition apart from deportation and
other unilateral measures that might be taken by a state against foreign criminals within
its borders. See SHEARER, supra note 18, at 19-20. Through reciprocity, extradition pro-
tects more than just the requested state's borders. "By reciprocal arrangements for
handing over each other's criminals ... a State preserves its own interest in punishing
those who have offended against its laws." Id.
20. See LA FoREsT, supra note 14, at 15.
21. See SHEARER, supra note 18, at 31.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 7.
24. See SHEARER, supra note 18, at 24-28. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994) prohibits the
surrender of fugitives to those countries with which the United States has no extradition
treaty. The Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 7, permits the extradition of fugitives to
countries with which Canada has no extradition treaty, but this has rarely in fact been
done. See LA FOREST, supra note 14, at 17-18.
25. See Schmidt v. the Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 40 (Can. 1987).
26. See discussion of the Extradition Treaty infra Part II.C.
27. See id.
28. See BAsSIoumN, supra note 19, at 457. It has been unsuccessfully contended that
the extradition of Canadian citizens from Canada is a constitutionally prohibited viola-
tion of the mobility rights guaranteed by section 6 of the Charter. ("Every citizen of
Canada has the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada." The Charter, supra note 9,
§ 6.) The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that extradition permissibly violates sec-
tion 6 under Charter section 1, which subjects Charter rights to "reasonable limits ... as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." The Charter, supra note
9, § 1. See United States v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d 193, 213-22 (Can. 1989). Neverthe-
less, Canadian courts have not made such explicit use of section 1 when confronting
section 7. See Dennis Klinck, The Charter and Substantive Criminal "Justice", 42 U. N.B.
(CAN.) LJ. 191, 207 (1993).
29. See, e.g., the Extradition Treaty infra Part II.C.
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relationship since its formal establishment over two hundred years ago. 30
Liberal extradition procedures between these two states are a necessity:
both are open and democratic, and travel between their common border is
relatively easy. Without an effective mechanism for the return of fugitives
fleeing justice, the U.S.-Canadian border would act as a severe impediment
to law enforcement.31 The United States and Canada have in fact
attempted to meet these needs, making extradition increasingly available
and flexible in the face of the increasing ease of cross-border travel.
1. Early History
The Jay Treaty of 1794 provided the first formal agreement governing the
extradition of fugitives between the United States and Canada, but only
allowed for the extradition of fugitives accused of murder or forgery.32 It
expired in 1807.33 Ratified in 1842, the Ashburton-Webster Treaty
expanded the list of extradition crimes to include "murder, or assault with
intent to commit murder, or Piracy, or arson, or robbery, or Forgery, or the
utterance of a forged paper."34 Later conventions heavily modified the
Ashburton-Webster Treaty, and significantly expanded its list of extradita-
ble crimes. Conventions to the treaty in 1889,35 1900,36 1908,3 7 1922,38
30. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 149-
58. The United States is responsible for the overwhelming majority of extradition
requests received by Canada. From 1985 to November of 1991, the United States
directed 361 extradition requests to Canada, while all other countries made only 74
such requests. Out of 350 requests from all states during that period (excluding 1987,
for which surrender numbers are not provided), Canada surrendered 183 fugitives. See
COMMONS DEBATES, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 4783 (1991) (Can.) (Mr. Ian Waddell).
32. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., art. 27, T.S. No. 105(S) [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. The United States and Great Brit-
ain entered into the Jay Treaty after the American Revolutionary War, and the Treaty
addressed issues such as the withdrawal of military forces from American and British
territories, indemnification, and border resolution. See generally id. See also LA FoRFasr,
supra note 14, at 2-3 (summarizing historical context of Jay Treaty with respect to
extradition).
33. See LA Foaasr, supra note 14, at 2-3
34. Boundary, Slave Trade, and Extradition Treaty (Ashburton-Webster Treaty), Aug.
9, 1842, U.S.-Gr.Brit., T.S. No. 119(S) [hereinafter the Ashburton-Webster Treaty]. In
the period betweeii the Jay and Ashburton-Webster Treaties, the United States and Can-
ada continued to surrender fugitives to each other, although not without difficulties. See
LA FoRsr, supra note 14, at 3-4; infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
35. Extradition Convention, July 12, 1889, U.S.-U.K., T.S. 139. The Convention also
provided fugitives with formal legal protections against the requesting country. Article It
incorporated the political offense exception, see infra Part II.C, and article III added the
specialty requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
36. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Dec. 13, 1900, U.S.-U.K., T.S. No. 391.
37. Treaty in Reference to Reciprocal Rights for United States and Canada in the
Matters of Conveyance of Prisoners and Wrecking and Salvage, May 18, 1908, U.S.-U.K.,
T.S. No. 502. The Treaty additionally specified procedural steps for the conveyance of
prisoners between the United States and Canada. See id. art. 1.
38. Supplementary Extradition Convention Between the United States and Great
Britain, May 15, 1922, U.S.-U.K., T.S. No. 666.
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1925,39 and 195140 brought to seventeen the number of crimes for which
extradition could take place.
Domestic Canadian law developed on a parallel track. When the Gov-
ernor of Canada refused to surrender four Canadians wanted in New York
State for murder, reasoning that such surrender would violate the Habeas
Corpus Act, Upper Canada 41 responded by passing an Act providing for
the surrender of fugitives charged with the commission of certain crimes. 4 2
That is, Canada unilaterally enacted a measure to allow it to surrender fugi-
tives to the United States. Similarly, in 1849 Canada suspended an English
statute which impeded the efficiency of extradition procedures by requir-
ing judges to wait for a formal requisition from the country requesting
extradition before issuing an arrest warrant. 43
2. The Extradition Treaty of 1971 and the 1988 Protocol
Prior to the 1971 Treaty, 4 4 seven different documents-most negotiated by
the United States and Great Britain-defined the U.S.-Canadian extradition
relationship. 45 The purposes of the 1971 Treaty were "to facilitate the
mutual efforts of the United States and Canada in combatting international
crime,"46 and to modernize U.S.-Canadian extradition relations.4 7
The 1971 Treaty did provide fugitives with some additional protec-
tions, such as the article 6 limitation on the extradition of fugitives facing
the death penalty. 4 8 Most significantly, however, it redefined the extradi-
tion crimes in modern language,49 expanded the number of extradition
39. Extradition on Account of Crimes or Offenses Against Narcotic Laws, Jan. 8,
1925, U.S.-U.K., T.S. No. 719 [hereinafter 1925 Convention].
40. Supplementary Convention between the United States of America and Canada,
Oct. 26, 1951, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 2454 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
41. Upper Canada covered the same territory as present-day Ontario. See GERALD
GALL, THE CANADIN LEGAL SYSTEM 51 (1990).
42. This was the Act of 1833, supra note 17. See CLARKE, supra note 17, at 93; LA
FoREST, supra note 14, at 3. The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, ch. 1 (1679) (Eng.),
granted British subjects certain rights, such as the right not to have soldiers quartered in
their homes without their consent. See id. Relevant to extradition, chapter II provided
British subjects overseas with certain procedural and substantive rights against
imprisonment.
43. See LA FOREST, supra note 14, at 3-4.
44. Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America, Dec. 3,
1971-July 9, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 [hereinafter 1971 Treaty]. The
United States Senate ratified the 1971 Treaty in 1975. See EXTRADMON TREATY WITH
CANADA, S. Rep. No. 94-17 at 4 (1975). It became effective in 1976 upon the exchange of
ratification documents between the United States and Canada. See 1971 Treaty, supra.
45. Including the Ashburton-Webster Treaty, as amended by the six subsequent con-
ventions. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
46. See S. Rep. No. 94-17 at 1.
47. "Modernization of the extradition relations between the United States and Can-
ada is especially important in light of the ease of travel between the two countries." Id.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. This had the effect of expanding the scope of certain extradition crimes. For
example, the 1951 Convention, supra note 40, included Crime I1B, "[m]aking use of the
mails in connection with schemes devised or intended to deceive or defraud the public
or for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretenses." The 1971 Treaty, supra
note 44, replaced "use of the mails" with "[u]se of the mails or other means of communi-
Vol. 30
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crimes from seventeen to thirty,50 and added "attempts and conspiracies"
to commit any extraditable crime as extradition crimes.51 That is, the
1971 Treaty cast a much broader, more efficient net than its predecessor.
The 1988 Protocol5 2 between the United States and Canada continued
the historic trend of further liberalizing the United States-Canadian extradi-
tion relationship. Most significantly, it eliminated the requirement that
extradition crimes be specifically enumerated,5 3 substituting a severity
requirement: "Extradition shall be granted for conduct which constitutes
an offense punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by imprison-
ment or some other form of detention for a term exceeding one year or any
greater punishment."5 4 The severity approach makes extradition easier in
part because it cannot easily become outdated: it does not limit the class of
extradition crimes by reference to static definitions of crimes, but rather by
reference to the punishment imposed. Further, it eliminates the possibility
that a fugitive who has committed a serious crime might not be extradita-
ble simply because that particular crime is not on the extraditable crimes
list.55
H1. Extradition Between the United States and Canada
The current Extradition Treaty5 6 (''Extradition Treaty") is the most liberal
extradition arrangement yet between the United States and Canada. Its
first article establishes that the United States and Canada are mutually
obliged to extradite fugitives who fall within its terms: "Each Contracting
Party agrees to extradite to the other, in the circumstances and subject to
the conditions described in this Treaty, persons found in its territory
cation." Thus, telephone or computer fraud became extradition crimes under the 1971
Treaty, while they clearly were not under the 1951 Convention.
50. See 1971 Treaty, supra note 44, sched.
51. See id. art. 2(2). See also S. Rep. No. 94-17 at 1. Earlier treaties had not included
attempts or conspiracies as extraditable crimes.
52. Protocol Dated January 11, 1988, Amending the Treaty on Extradition Between
Canada and the United States of America, Jan. 11, 1988, U.S.-Can., Hein's No. KAV 237
[hereinafter the 1988 Protocol]. The President submitted the 1988 Protocol to the Sen-
ate in April of 1990, and it was ratified on August 2, 1991. PROTOCOL AMENDING THE
EXTRADITION TREATY WrrH CANADA, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
S. REP. No. 101-17 (1990).
53. See 1971 Treaty, supra note 44, art. 2.
54. 1988 Protocol, supra note 52, art. 1.
55. For example, the 1971 Treaty broadened the extradition crime of mail fraud to
include fraud through other forms of communication.' See supra note 49. While this
particular provision of the 1971 Treaty might not become outdated, new technologies
will inevitably create new crimes. Criminals committing these new crimes would be
immune to extradition under a listing approach to extradition crimes unless the treaty
were further amended. See also COMMONS DEBATES, 34th Par., 3rd Sess., 4783 (1991)
(Can.) (Mr. Ian Waddell) (criticizing the outdated crime schedules of many Canadian
extradition treaties). The listing approach went to absurd lengths to be all-inclusive. For
example, the "unlawful throwing or application of any corrosive substances at or upon
the person of another" was an extraditable crime under the 1971 Treaty. 1971 Treaty,
supra note 44, sched.
56. Hereinafter, "Extradition Treaty" shall refer to the 1971 Treaty, supra note 44, as
amended by the 1988 Protocol, supra note 52.
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.... 57s This Part examines in turn the general procedure of U.S.-Canadian
extraditions, the substantive requirements for an extradition to proceed,
and the recognized exceptions to the general duty of extradition.
A. Extradition Procedure
The Extradition Treaty provides the skeletal procedural framework for
extradition. The Extradition Act,5 8 however, is the specific mechanism by
which fugitives are extradited from Canada. Both the executive and judi-
cial branches of the Canadian government hold essentialfroles in every
extradition,5 9 although a "surrender under [an extradition treaty] is pri-
marily an Executive act."60
1. Procedure Under the Extradition Treaty
The Extradition Treaty provides formal and informal extradition proce-
dures. Article 9 of the Treaty defines formal extradition procedures, speci-
fying both the method 61 and content62 of formal extradition requests. In
practice, however, the requesting state often does not make a formal extra-
dition request until after the arrest of the fugitive. 63 Article 11 accounts for
an alternative procedure, permitting the requesting country "in case of
urgency" to apply for the "provisional arrest" of the fugitive pending a for-
mal article 9 request.64 In either case, the requesting state must properly
57. Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 1.
58. Extradition Act, supra note 6.
59. See LA FOREST, supra note 14, at 28.
60. Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 34 (Can. 1987). The executive is given
wide discretion in making extradition decisions, while the judiciary plays a narrowly
focused supervisory role. But see COMMONS DEBATEs, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 4816 (1991)
(Can.) (Mr. Peter Milliken) (advocating removing the surrender power from the Minister
of Justice and vesting it in the courts).
61. Formal extradition requests are to be made through diplomatic channels. See
Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 9(1). The Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 20(1),
describes the "diplomatic channel," but this usage has now become obsolete. See LA
FoREs-r, supra note 14, at 198. Current practice requires that the formal request, the
requisition, be delivered by a diplomatic representative of the requesting state to either
the Department of Justice or the Department of External Affairs. See id.
62. Article 9(2) of the Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, requires "a description of
the person sought, a statement of the facts of the case, the text of the laws of the request-
ing State describing the offense and prescribing the punishment for the offense, and a
statement of the law relating to the limitation of the legal proceedings." Article 9(3)
requires a warrant for the fugitive's arrest issued by a judge of the requesting state, as
well as any evidence that would be necessary in the requesting state for the arrest and
committal of the fugitive. In the case of a person already convicted, article 9(4) requires
that the request be accompanied by, inter alia, the judgment of conviction.
63. See LA FOREST, supra note 14, at 123-124.
64. A person arrested under article 11(1) is to be set at liberty if the application
specified by article 9 is not received within 60 days of the fugitive's arrest. Extradition
Treaty, supra note 56, art. 11(3). Further, under article 11:
Such application shall contain a description of the person sought, an indication
of intention to request the extradition of the person sought and a statement of
the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction against that
person, and such further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify the
issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been committed, or the person
sought been convicted, in the territory of the requested State.
Vol. 30
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make a formal request, a requisition, before the fugitive may be
surrendered.6 5
2. Procedure Under the Extradition Act
The extradition of a fugitive who has fled to Canada proceeds in a series of
discrete steps. The requesting state must first obtain a Canadian warrant
for the fugitive's arrest. Under section 10(1) of the Extradition Act, a Cana-
dian judge66 may issue such a warrant if presented with a foreign warrant
or "an information or a complaint,"67 and evidence that would be sufficient
to justify arresting the fugitive for an act allegedly committed in Canada. 68
Upon the fugitive's arrest, a judge conducts an extradition hearing. 69
The purpose of the extradition hearing is "to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to warrant the fugitive being sent to the foreign country
where he is alleged to have committed a crime for which he may be surren-
dered under the Extradition Act," but not to judge the fugitive's guilt or
innocence. 70 The extradition judge "merely [has the authority] to deter-
mine whether the relevant crime falls within the appropriate treaty and
whether the evidence presented is sufficient to justify the executive surren-
dering the fugitive."71
In order for the extradition judge to commit the fugitive to prison
pending the Minister of Justice's surrender decision, the requirements of
section 18(1) of the Extradition Act must be met:
(a) in the case of a fugitive alleged to have been convicted of an extradition
crime, if such evidence is produced [by the requesting state] as would,
according to the law of Canada... prove that the fugitive was so convicted;
and
I.
65. See LA FoREsT, supra note 14, at 197. Cf. supra note 64 (the requirement that a
fugitive be set free unless a formal article 9 extradition request is received within 60 days
implies that such a request would also be a necessary precondition for extradition);
Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 25.
66. This includes superior and county court judges, as well as extradition commis-
sioners. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 9(1).
67. An information is "[ain accusation exhibited against a person for some criminal
complaint, without an indictment." BLAcu's LAw DICrIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). The
person presenting the Canadian court with an information need not be an agent of the
foreign government, but may be anyone "vho would be entitled to institute proceedings
if the crime had been committed in Canada." LA FoRmsr, supra note 14, at 126-27.
68. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 10(1). Upon issuing the warrant, the judge
must "send a report of the fact of the issue of the warrant ... together with certified
copies of the evidence and foreign warrant, information or complaint to the Minister of
Justice." Id. § 10(2). The Minister is kept informed of the developments of each particu-
lar extradition because the Minister has limited powers to cancel a warrant and order the
discharge of the fugitive. See LA FoRmsT, supra note 14, at 129.
69. The Extradition Act, supra note 6, §§ 13-17, provides the procedural and eviden-
tiary rules for the hearing. The judge conducting the extradition hearing is almost inva-
riably the same judge who issued the arrest warrant. See LA FoREST, supra note 14, at
131. This hearing is also called a "committal hearing." Similarly, judicial committal
and extradition orders are the same thing.
70. See LA FoREsr, supra note 14, at 141.
71. Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74, 89 (Can. 1987).
Cornell International Law Journal
(b) in the case of a fugitive accused of an extradition crime, if such evidence
is produced [by the requesting state] as would, according to the law of Can-
ada ... justify the committal of the fugitive for trial, if the crime had been
committed in Canada. 72
The Canadian courts have established an extremely lenient test for the sat-
isfaction of section 18(1). So long as there is some view of the evidence
which would justify a criminal conviction of the fugitive by a reasonable
jury, the extradition may take place. 73 That is, the requesting state must
only make out a prima facie case, and defenses that could be raised at trial
are ordinarily outside of the extradition judge's jurisdiction.7 4 If the
requesting state fails to produce such evidence, the extradition judge must
discharge the fugitive. 75
Upon committing a fugitive for extradition, the extradition judge must
inform the fugitive of his right to apply for habeas corpus relief from the
committal order, and transmit a certificate of the committal order and
other information to the Minister of Justice.7 6 However, the possibility of
obtaining habeas relief from the committal order is probably nonexistent.
Because of extradition's largely political nature, Canadian courts have
proven extremely reluctant to pre-empt a surrender decision by the Minis-
ter of Justice. 77
72. Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 18(1). The Extradition Act also provides eviden-
tiary rules for the section 18 inquiry:
16. Depositions or statements taken in a foreign state on oath, or on solemn
affirmation, where affirmation is allowed by the law of that state, and copies of
the depositions or statements and foreign certificates of, or judicial documents
stating the fact of, conviction may, if duly authenticated, be received in evidence
17. The documents referred to in section 16 shall be deemed authenticated if
authenticated in the manner provided by law, or if
(a) the warrant purports to be signed by, the certificate purports to be cer-
tified by, [etc.] ... a judge, magistrate or officer of the foreign state- and
(b) the documents are authenticated by the oath or solemn affirmation of a
wimess, or by being sealed with the official seal, [etc.] ....
Extradition Act, supra note 6, §§ 16-17. Despite the tortured language of the Act, extradi-
tion judges "liberally construe [these provisions] so as to give effect to our international
obligations." LA FoREST, supra note 14, at 154. But see Commons Debates, 34th Parl.,
3rd Sess., 9415 (1992) (Can.) (Mr. George S. Rideout) (criticizing the perceived laxness
of extradition evidentiary rules).
73. See LA Foms-r, supra note 14, at 148-150.
74. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 34 (Can. 1987).
75. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 18(2).
76. See id. § 19. See infra Part III for substantive issues in habeas attacks upon extra-
dition proceedings.
77. For example, the Mellino court did not even consider the possibility of judicial
intervention under the Charter prior to the executive's decision:
There may, it is true, conceivably be situations where it would be unjust to sur-
render a fugitive .... These are judgements, however, that are pre-eminently
within the authority and competence of the executive to make. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, on occasion have a useful role to play in reviewing
such decisions, but it is obviously an area in which courts must tread with
caution.
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Assuming that the committal order survives any habeas petition, the
final step in the extradition process is the Minister of Justice's decision to
grant or refuse the surrender of the fugitive.78 Although discretionary, this
decision is constrained by operation of the Extradition Act, the Extradition
Treaty, and by the Charter.79 The fugitive may seek habeas corpus relief
from a surrender order.80 However, while the Supreme Court of Canada
has repeatedly stated that the Minister's surrender decision is subject to
Charter limitations upon habeas review,81 it has refused to permit the
reversal of a single surrender order during the history of the Charter. If the
Minister does refuse to surrender the fugitive, that fugitive must be dis-
charged from prison within two months after his committal for
surrender.82
B. Substantive Requirements for Extradition
Modem treaties typically incorporate certain substantive rules of extradi-
tion.83 Reciprocity is a fundamental basis for these rules,8 4 which collec-
tively ensure that a fugitive must be extraditable from both parties to the
treaty before he is extraditable from either. Drawing upon these rules, the
Extradition Treaty requires double criminality, an extraditable offense, and
specialty before an extradition may take place.
Double criminality requires that the act for which the fugitive is to be
extradited is a punishable offense in both countries, 85 and is a precondi-
tion to extradition under the Extradition Treaty.8 6 In Meier and the Queen,
the Supreme Court of Canada explained that "the acts alleged must not
only be a crime within the requesting state, but must be such that, if the
factual situation was reversed, they would be a crime within Canada."8 7
Nevertheless, while both states must have criminalized the fugitive's con-
duct, it need not amount to the same crime.88
An extraditable offense, also commonly referred to as "extradition
crime," is a crime for which extradition is available.89 The Extradition
Treaty defines extraditable offenses through its severity requirement: the
crime charged must be punishable in both countries "by imprisonment or
other form of detention for a term exceeding one year or any greater
Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74, 91 (Can. 1987) (emphasis added).
See also Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39-40 (Can. 1987) ("in most cases, at
least, judicial intervention should await the exercise of executive discretion").
78. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 25.
79. See infra Part IIl.
80. See Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th at 92-93.
81. See, e.g., id. at 91; Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 39-40.
82. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 28.
83. See BAssioumn, supra note 19, at 319-20.
84. See id. at 321.
85. See id. at 324; LA FoREsr, supra note 14, at 68.
86. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 2.
87. Meier and the Queen, 6 C.C.C.3d 165, 173 (B.C. Ct. App. 1983).
88. See LA FoREsT, supra note 14, at 70-72.
89. See generally BAssioum, supra note 19, at 328-29.
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punishment."90
Specialty limits the requesting state to trying the fugitive for only those
specific crimes for which surrender took place.9 1 Both the Extradition
Treaty9 2 and domestic Canadian law have incorporated the speciality
requirement.
9 3
C. Exceptions to the General Rule of Extradition
Extradition "shall not be granted"94 under the Treaty if the fugitive faces
double jeopardy, 95 if prosecution is barred by the requesting state's statute
of limitations,9 6 or if the offense for which extradition is requested is a
political crime.9 7 The requested state may also recommend that the
request for extradition be withdrawn, or that surrender be deferred in cer-
tain narrow circumstances. 98 Finally, a catch-all provision establishes that
the domestic law of the contracting parties controls in the case of any con-
flict with Treaty obligations.99
More contentious has been Treaty article 6, which permits the
requested state to condition extradition upon the requesting state's agree-
ment not to impose the death penalty when it would not be imposed under
the laws of the requested state.10 0 However, the assertion of this right has
90. Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 2.
91. See BASsIOUNI, supra note 19, at 359-60.
92. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 12.
93. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 23.
94. Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 4(1). These are considerations for the
Minister of Justice to take into account in making the surrender decision, subject to
judicial review through the habeas petition.
95. See id. art. 4(1). Article 4(1)(i) reads: "When the person whose surrender is
sought is being proceeded against, or has been tried and discharged or punished in the
territory of the requested State for the offense for which his extradition is requested."
See also LA FoREsr, supra note 14, at 109-14 (describing Canadian double jeopardy juris-
prudence and its relationship to extradition).
96. See Extradition Treaty, supia note 56, art. 4(1)(ii).
97. See id. art. 4(1)(iii). However, article 4(2) excludes crimes such as murder and
kidnapping from this exception. See id. See also Extradition Act, supra note 6, §§ 15, 21,
22 (codifying the political offense restriction). See generally LA FoREs-r, supra note 14, at
81-98 (describing history and current status of the political offense exception in Cana-
dian extradition law); BAssiouNI, supra note 19, ch. 8, § 2.1 (describing political offense
exception); SHEARER, supra note 18, ch. 7 (same).
98. Article 5 concerns fugitives under 18 years of age, and article 7 those fugitives
who are being tried or are serving a sentence in the requested country at the time of the
extradition request. Extradition Treaty, supra note 56.
99. The decision to surrender a fugitive "shall be made in accordance with the law of
the requested State," and the fugitive "shall have the right to use all remedies and
recourses provided by such law." Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 8.
100. Article 6 reads:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do no
permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the
requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State considers suffi-
cient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be
executed.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 6. See also LA Foas-r, supra note 14, at 202-09
(describing issue from Canadian legal perspective); BASSIoUNI, supra note 19, at 491-93
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proved to be the exception rather than the rule. In both Kindler v. Canada
and Ng,' 01 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the unconditional surren-
der by the Minister of Justice of fugitives facing the death penalty in the
United States, despite the Minister's explicit article 6 right to receive assur-
ances from the United States that neither would be put to death.' 0 2 More
recently, however, the same Minister did require such an assurance before
surrendering a fugitive wanted for murder to the United States.' 03
Ill. The Habeas Corpus Petition
A fugitive may seek review of a committal or surrender order through a
writ of habeas corpus.' 0 4 The right to so challenge a committal order
devolves from the Extradition Act,' 0 5 while the right to challenge a surren-
der order is established by the Charter.'0 6 A court hearing a habeas
corpus petition is "ordinarily confined to questions of jurisdiction,"' 0 7 but
the Supreme Court of Canada has held that "a court in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings is obviously the court of competent jurisdiction for purposes of s.
24 of the Charter."' 0 8 That is, it is competent to hear constitutional com-
plaints such as Jamieson's complaint that his surrender violates the section
7 guarantee of fundamental justice. Consequently, an extradition-related
habeas petition may have two prongs. The first prong is jurisdictional,
(recognizing general phenomena of similar treaty provisions worldwide); SHaEAa, supra
note 18, at 149 (same). Ironically, it was the United States that requested this provision.
At the time of the Treaty's negotiation, Canada but not the United State had the death
penalty. See COMMONS DBAmFs, 34th Par., 3rd Sess., 9421 (1992) (Can.) (Mr. Bill
Domm).
101. Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 489 (Can. 1991); In re Ng Extradition, 84
D.L.R.4th 498 (Can. 1991). But see John Pak, Note, Canadian Extradition and the Death
Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CoPU L, IN' L.J. 239 (1993)
(arguing that Kindler and Ng were wrongly decided).
102. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
103. SeeJohn F. Bums, Canada Wins U.S. Extradition Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992,
at A3. Lee O'Bomsawin was wanted by Florida for the double murder of his wife and
her lover, and faced the possibility of death by electrocution. See id. ThenJustice Minis-
ter Campbell did not publicly provide any reasons for Canada's first ever assertion of its
article 6 rights. See id.
104. See generally LA FoRasr, supra note 14, at 180-91 (describing Canadian habeas
corpus law as it relates to extradition). Appeals from habeas corpus decisions by either
party (the fugitive or the government) are provided for by R.S.C., ch. 53, § 719 (1965)
(Can.). "Where a judgement is issued on the return of a writ of habeas corpus ... an
appeal therefrom lies to the Court of Appeal, and from a judgement of the Court of
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada .... " Id.
105. Cf. LA FoREsT, supra note 14, at 180-91. See Extradition Act, supra note 6,
§§ 19(a) and 23. Section 19(a) requires the committing court to notify the fugitive of his
right to apply for habeas corpus relief, and section 23 prohibits the surrender of a fugi-
tive until after the decision of the court hearing a habeas petition. And, as inJamieson,
either party to the habeas proceedings may appeal an adverse decision.
106. Cf. LA FoREsr, supra note 14, at 180-91. See Republic of Argentina v. Melino, 40
D.L.R.4th 74, 91-92 (Can. 1987). The Mellino court explains that the right to habeas
review of discretionary executive acts such as the surrender decision is established by
section 24 of the Charter.
107. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th at 92.
108. Id. Section 24(1) is the Charter's basic remedial provision.
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attacking a committal order for failure to comply with statutory or treaty
requirements. 10 9 The second prong is constitutional, alleging that either
the committal or surrender order was constitutionally deficient. 110
The timing of a habeas petition is crucial. The Mellino court
explained:
[A] court must firmly keep in mind that it is in the Executive that the discre-
tion to surrender a fugitive is vested. Consequently, barring obvious or
urgent circumstances, the Executive should not be pre-empted .... [I]t may
be doubted that the courts should ordinarily intervene before the executive
has made an order of surrender. 11 1
That is, reviewing courts should rarely grant habeas petitions filed after the
committal order but before the Minister of Justice has issued a surrender
order. This delay may be rationalized on several grounds. First, the Minis-
ter may refuse to surrender the fugitive, making the habeas petition irrele-
vant. Second, the authority to order an extradition is granted to the
Minister by the Extradition Act, 112 and the courts are reluctant to intrude
upon this authority. 1 13 Third, the Minister is presumed to be better
informed than the courts to make what is largely a foreign affairs and polit-
ical decision. 1 14 The lower courts have generally respected and echoed the
Mellino court's command. 115 Because successful constitutional challenges
to the judicial committal order have been practically precluded by the
Supreme Court of Canada, the remainder of this Note confines itself to the
application for relief from the Minister's surrender order.
IV. Extradition and the Charter
Writing the majority opinion in Schmidt v. The Queen, Supreme Court of
Canada Justice La Forest succinctly asserted the ultimate supremacy of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the extradition context: "The
pre-eminence of the Constitution must be recognized; the treaty, the extra-
dition hearing in this country and the exercise of the executive discretion to
surrender a fugitive must all conform to the requirements of the Charter
109. For example, the habeas judge may review whether the requesting state has met
its evidentiary burden against the fugitive, or whether the offense charged is an extradi-
tion crime. See LA Fomsr, supra note 14, at 181. Note, however, that the most signifi-
cant treaty/statutory requirements are easily satisfied: the requesting state only need
advance prima facie evidence, and all crimes punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment are extraditable offenses. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74, 89-
90.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Janileson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265 (Que. Ct. App. 1994).
111. Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74, 93 (Can. 1987).
112. See Extradition Act, supra note 6, § 25.
113. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 111.
114. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 40 (Can. 1987).
115. See, e.g., Jamieson v. United States, 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 466-467 (Que. Ct. App.
1992): "in most cases ... judicial intervention should await the exercise of executive
discretion" (quoting Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 40). But see United States v. El Zein, 29
C.C.C.3d 560 (Que. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd sub nom, United States v. Cotroni, 48
C.C.C.3d 193 (Can. 1989), where the lower court quashed the committal orders of the
fugitives before the Minister of Justice had made a surrender decision.
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* ,"116 Nevertheless, Justice La Forest recognized in United States v.
Cotroni that the proper Charter inquiry must also be context sensitive:
[Tihe Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and the rights set out therein
must be interpreted rationally having regard to the then existing laws and, in
the instant case, to the position which Canada occupies in the world and the
effective history of the multitude of extradition treaties it has had with other
nations.11 7
These quotations betray a tension between two competing values: the
Charter is the supreme law of Canada, but it is also an historical document
which must be understood in an historical context. Several basic-if not
entirely independent-issues emerge from this tension. How is the Charter
relevant to the surrender decision? What sections of the Charter apply to
the surrender decision? How does the Charter constrain the surrender
decision? What is the proper standard of review under the Charter? The
sections that follow explore these issues.
A. The Power of Review
The Canadian courts have recognized that extradition proceedings must
conform to constitutional standards.' 18 The starting point for the constitu-
tional review of extradition proceedings is section 24 of the Charter: "Any-
one whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the cir-
cumstances." 1 19 Because a Canadian court hearing an extradition-related
habeas corpus petition is "a court of competent jurisdiction" for Charter
purposes, such a court has the power under section 24 to remedy constitu-
tional deficiencies in that extradition.
120
Section 32 establishes that Charter guarantees apply against acts by
the Canadian government. 12 1 Accepting the plain meaning of section 32,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen
that decisions by the federal cabinet fall under Charter section 32(1)(a)
and thus are amenable to constitutional review by the courts. 12 2 The
Schmidt court explicitly extended section 32 to the case of extradition deci-
sions, ruling that "[t]here can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by
the Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject to
scrutiny under the Charter (s. 32)."123 The government action subject to
Charter scrutiny inJamieson is the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.
116. Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 38 (Can. 1987).
117. United States v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d 193, 219 (Can. 1989).
118. See, e.g., Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 38.
119. The Charter, supra note 9, § 24.
120. See Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74, 92-93 (Can. 1987). See
supra Part III.
121. "This Charter applies... to the Parliament and government of Canada .... " The
Charter, supra note 9, § 32(1)(a).
122. See Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 18 D.L.R.4th 481, 491 (Can. 1985).
123. Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 36 (Can. 1987). See also LA Fopasr,
supra note 14, at 24 (extradition decisions subject to Charter scrutiny).
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B. Procedural and Substantive Constraints upon Extradition
The Charter constrains the surrender of a fugitive in two ways. First, it
imposes a duty of procedural fairness upon the Minister. 12 4 However, pro-
cedural challenges to extradition proceedings have not amounted to much
more than a jurisprudential sideshow. For example, in a fifty-page deci-
sion the Kindler court rejected Kindler's claimed right to an oral hearing
with the Minister in three terse sentences. 12 5 The Quebec Jamieson court
addressed and dismissed the entire subject of procedural fairness just as
quickly.126 Neither court cited a single authority.
More significantly, the Charter prohibits any extradition that would be
substantively unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of Canada
has greatly limited the scope of Charter rights that apply to extradition.
The Kindler court ruled that the section 12 prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment would not apply to the Canadian government's sur-
render of a fugitive:
The punishment, if any, to which the fugitive is ultimately subject will be
punishment imposed, not by the Government of Canada, but by the foreign
state .... To apply sec. 12 directly to the act of surrender to a foreign coun-
try where a particular penalty may be imposed, is to overshoot the purpose
of the guarantee and to cast the net of the Charter broadly in extraterritorial
waters. 1
2 7
This restriction on Charter rights has two necessary components. First,
limiting the Charter's force to Canadian territory makes it inapplicable to
the acts of foreign governments. Second, excluding the surrender decision
from the class of government actions that are within the scope of section
12 makes section 12 inapplicable to that action. The Schmidt court's con-
clusion that an extradition proceeding is not subject to the Charter's prohi-
bition against double jeopardy follows the same pattern. 128 Nevertheless
124. See LA FoR.s'r, supra note 14, at 209-10. The jurisprudential source of this duty
is Nicholson, 88 D.L.R.3d 671 (Can. 1978). Nicholson held that the courts may imply an
obligation for the executive to act fairly because Parliament is presumed to not act
unfairly. See id. at 680-81. In Nicholson, the precise issue was whether a Board of Police
Commissioners had to provide a dismissed constable with notice and a rationale for his
dismissal. See id. at 672-73. Although the court did not precisely define "fairness," the
rule that emerged from the case was that certain procedures were guaranteed by this
right to fair treatment. See id. at 680-81. The court did, however, stress that "executive
efficiency and economy should not too readily be sacrificed" for the sake of fairness. Id.
125. "I reject Kindler's submission that he had the right to an oral hearing before the
Minister. He was afforded that right at the stage of the judicial hearing. No further oral
hearing is required at the second stage of the Minister's final decision." Kindler v. Can-
ada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 497 (Can. 1991) (McLachlin, J.).
126. United States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 276 (Que. Ct. App. 1994):
The detailed reasons set out extensively by the Justice Minister in her letter to
Jamieson demonstrate beyond question that her decision was reached after fair
and careful consideration. Jamieson has clearly had the benefit of a thorough
and equitable decision-making process. From a procedural point of view, there
is plainly no issue regarding any violation of s. 7 of the Charter.
127. Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 489.
128. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39-40 (Can. 1987); Charter, supra
note 9, § 11(h).
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the court has also consistently held that the section 7 Charter right to fun-
damental justice applies to extradition, serving as a restraint on the Minis-
ter's surrender decision.129
C. Section 7 and Fundamental Justice
Charter section 7 reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice."130 The Supreme Court of Can-
ada has consistently held that section 7 could bar the surrender of a fugi-
tive, 131 despite the doctrine against the extraterritorial application of the
Charter.132 Nevertheless, section 7 has yet to actually prevent an
extradition.
1. The Jurisprudential Rhetoric
Justice La Forest comprehensively describes the section 7 inquiry in
Schmidt:
I have no doubt either that in some circumstances the manner in which the
foreign State will deal with the fugitive on surrender, whether that course of
conduct is justifiable or not under the law of that country, may be such that
it would violate the principles of fundamental justice to surrender an
accused under the circumstances .... Situations falling far short of [torture]
may well arise where the nature of the criminal procedures or penalties in a
foreign country sufficiently shocks the conscience as to make a decision to
surrender a fugitive for trial there one that breaches the principles of funda-
mental justice enshrined in s. 7.133
Thus, the treatment faced by a fugitive in the requesting state may so shock
some (undefined) conscience as to preclude surrender.134 Justice La For-
est employs additional rhetorical tools, appealing to "the basic demands of
justice"1 35 and the possibility that an extradition is "sufficiently oppressive
... to warrant refusing surrender."'136
In Kindler v. Canada, the State of Pennsylvania had convicted Joseph
129. See infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
130. The Charter, supra note 9, § 7.
131. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39-40 (Can. 1987); Kindler v. Can-
ada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 490 (Can. 1991).
132. The court distinguished section 7 from section 12: "While s. 12 of the Charter
may not apply since the acts to which is directed occur outside of Canada, our law of
extradition and the Minister's acts pursuant to that law do fall under the Charter and the
general guarantees found in s. 7." Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 490. That is, section 7 is not
limited to checking specific acts in specific contexts (such as the section 12 prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment, which only applies to punishment, see supra text
accompanying note 127), but rather broadly applies to any act by the Canadian
government.
133. Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 39-40 (emphasis added). This statement has been
widely cited by Canadian courts. See, e.g., Kindler, 84 D.L.1.4th at 438, 492; United
States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 278 (Que. Ct. App. 1994).
134. See infra Part V.C.2 for a discussion of the different consciences that the courts
have relied upon.
135. Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 40.
136. Id. at 45.
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Kindler of murder and sentenced him to death.' 37 Kindler was captured in
Canada, and the Minister of Justice offered Kindler for surrender without
obtaining assurances that Pennsylvania would not carry out his execution,
despite Canada's right under the Extradition Treaty to obtain such assur-
ances.138 Justice McLachlin was joined by four of the seven justices on the
Supreme Court of Canada in ruling that Kindler's surrender did not violate
section 7.139 After quoting Schmidt's "shocks the conscience" language,
Justice McLachlin consulted the "Canadian sense of what is fair, right and
just."140 What this actually means to a fugitive is not clear on its face. As
Justice Cory said, dissenting:
[N]o matter how vile the killing, Kindler would not be executed in Canada
had he committed the murder in this country. Further, Canada has commit-
ted itself in the international community to the recognition and support of
human dignity and to the abolition of the death penalty. These commit-
ments were not lightly made. They reflect Canadian values and
principles. 14 1
That is, if Kindler's extradition does not "offend the Canadian sense of
what is fair, right and just," what would? Justice McLachlin supports her
affirmation of the surrender order by arguing that Canadian attitudes
towards the death penalty are not clear. She cites "persistent calls to bring
back the death penalty,"' 42 the defeat of a motion in Parliament to rein-
state capital punishment by a slim margin, 143 and the "considerable sup-
port" shown for the death penalty in public opinion polls. 1 4 4 With the
"Canadian conscience" split on the unjustness of Kindler's surrender, the
court was forced but to decide Kindler on other legal grounds.
137. See Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 485.
138. See id. See also In re Ng Extradition, 84 D.L.R.4th 498 (Can. 1991) (fugitive
facing death penalty in California). Ng had only been committed for extradition and
had not yet been surrendered, but Canadian Minister of Justice Kim Campbell referred
his case to the Supreme Court of Canada to be decided with Kindler. See COMMONS
DEBATFS, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 4779 (Can.) (Hon. Kim Campbell).
139. L'Heureux-Dube and Gonthier, JJ., concurred with Justice McLachlin. See Kin-
dler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 452, 455. LaForest, J., wrote a separate opinion but was "substan-
tially in accord with McLachlin, J." Id. at 445.
140. "[Tlhe question is whether the provision or action in question offends the
Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind the nature of the
offense and the penalty, the foreign justice system and considerations of comity
and security, and according due latitude to the Minister to balance the conflict-
ing considerations."
Id. at 492. Justice La Forest concurs with this approach to determining the Canadian
conscience. See id. at 446-47.
141. Id. at 481.
142. Id. at 493.
143. The vote was 148 to 127. See id. at 493.
144. See id. at 494. Justice La Forest states in his concurrence that "1 do not think the
courts should determine unacceptability in terms of statistical measurements of
approval or disapproval by the public at large, but it is fair to say that they afford some
insight into the public values of the community." Id. at 447. That is, he cautiously
agrees with McLachlin's approach to determining the public conscience.
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2. The Rationales of the Section 7 Inquiry
Despite the court's ihetorical flourishes, closer inspection of the section 7
jurisprudence reveals a balance "between fairness and efficiency. "145
Showing the proper deference to executive acts of discretion is the weighti-
est factor in this balance. Justice La Forest stresses the primacy of defer-
ence in Schmidt:
[T]he courts must begin with the notion that the Executive must first have
determined that the general system for the administration of justice in the
foreign country sufficiently corresponds to our concepts of justice to war-
rant entering into the treaty in the first place, and must have recognized that
it too has a duty to ensure that its actions comply with constitutional
standards. 146
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has warned against blind judi-
cial deference, 14 7 and has equipped the lower courts with several reasons
to justify a surrender decision. However, these factors tend only to work in
one direction-towards legitimizing the surrender order-and the court
does not cite any tangible concerns which might support the finding that a
surrender order violates section 7.148
First, effective crime control requires effective extradition proce-
dures. 149 The long border between the United States and Canada, the ease
and rapidity of modern communications and transportation, and the
severe illicit drug problem in the United States are all factors contributing
to the forced interdependence of United States and Canadian law enforce-
145. See id. at 490-91.
146. Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 40 (Can. 1987) (emphasis added). Jus-
tice McLachlin quotes this same passage in Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 496
(Can. 1991), and also alludes to the "superior placement of the executive" to resolve the
competing interests in an extradition case. See id. at 491-92.
147. See Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 40.
148. I.e., something more concrete than rhetorical devices like "shocks the con-
science." There is one very narrow exception: the Schmidt court explicitly recognized
that the imposition of torture would violate section 7. See Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 39.
149. See United States v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d 193, 222 (Can. 1989):
Extradition ... has been a major tool of international co-operation in bringing
fugitives to justice and combating crime. But for a system of extradition to be
effective, reliance must be placed on the initiative and co-operation of law
enforcement and judicial and administrative bodies at many levels and in many
countries.
See also SHEARE, supra note 18, at 23 (asserting that the viability of instruments of inter-
national cooperation for the suppression of crime is "of the utmost importance in the
present state of extradition law and practice"); Kellee A. Brown & Sophia A. Muirhead,
Extradition: Divergent Trends in International Cooperation, 33 HAgv. INT'L LJ. 223, 229
n.38, 232, 238 (1992) (stressing the increasing need for international cooperation
against international drug trafficking). Although Jamieson does not directly involve
international drug trafficking, or even significant intrastate drug trafficking, the manner
of its resolution is of great importance to law enforcement efforts to stem such traffick-
ing through its effect upon the U.S.-Canadian extradition relationship. More specifi-
cally, the Jamieson case affected the extradition of thirty seven other suspects caught
fleeing to Canada from the United States. See Harmon, supra note 12.
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ment efforts.150 To be effective, extradition must be readily available, as
reflected in the typically low evidentiary requirements imposed upon the
requesting state.151 Lengthy extradition procedures impede the ability of
the requesting state to carry out an effective prosecution and may impede
the fugitive's defense.152 As the court in Burley stated: "The [extradition]
treaty is based on the assumption that each country should be trusted with
the trial of offenses committed within its jurisdiction."15 3 If extradition
hearings were to effectively escalate into full-blown criminal trials, extradi-
tion would become too unwieldy to serve as an effective means of sup-
pressing crime.154
Second, as noted by the Kindler court, the fear of becoming a "safe
haven" for foreign criminals is one of the primary rationales for extradi-
tion:155 "Given our long undefended common border with the United
States, it is not unreasonable for the Minister, in deciding whether to seek
the assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed, to consider the
danger of encouraging other fugitives to do what Ng and Kindler did."
156
Historically, this fear was realized when the United States and Britain
could not agree upon an enlarged list of extradition crimes under the Ash-
burton-Webster Treaty. With extradition relations unsettled, Canada
became a refuge for American criminals, and five American offenders fled
to Canada for each fugitive that left Canada for the United States.15 7 This
150. As the Cotroni court noted: "Because of the facility with which criminals can
escape from one country to the other, Canada and the United States have always been in
the forefront of the development procedure." 48 C.C.C.3d at 219. See also Kindler v.
Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 487-488 (Can. 1991) (describing unique U.S.-Canadian
extradition needs). Crime control was a significant factor in the signing of the 1971
Treaty. See supra text accompanying note 46.
151. In the case of an extradition from Canada, the requesting state need only make
out a prima facie 'case. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
152. In a debate concerning amendments to the Extradition Act, Parliamentary Secre-
tary to the Minister for Science Mr. Bill Domm commented on the six year delay in the
Ng extradition: "[The families of Ng's victims] were concerned they were never going to
be able to try Ng. The witnesses were dying and moving. It had gone on for so long that
they were having trouble putting together witnesses for a trial." COMMONS DEBATES, 34th
Parl., 3rd Sess., 9421 (1992) (Can.). See also COMMONS DEBATES, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess.,
4779 (1991) (Can.) (Hon. Kim Campbell) ("the aging of evidence, the death of witnesses
and the inability of prosecutors to keep a case alive" may allow fugitives to evade justice
when extradition is long delayed).
153. Re Burley, 1 C.LJ. 34. 50 (1865) (Can.), quoted in LA FOREST, supra note 14, at
22.
154. The Schmidt court addressed this issue in the context of affirmative defenses.
"[A]n attempt by courts to consider defenses more appropriately dealt with at trial could
seriously affect the efficient working of a salutary system devised by states for the
mutual surrender of suspected wrongdoers." Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 35.
155. See supra note 17.
156. Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 495. Justice McLachlin responds to dissent objections
that this has not been supported by empirical evidence by noting: "It was argued that
there was little statistical evidence that criminals routinely cross the border into Canada
.... What is certain is that this is precisely what happened in the two cases before the
court. ... " Id. at 494-495. The court does not explain how Ng and Kindler escaped into
Canada. Given the length and openness of the U.S.-Canadian border, however, crossing
over could not be very difficult.
157. See LA FoRFsr, supra note 14, at 13-14.
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inflow did not cease until Canada passed statutes in 1869 and 1889
expanding the scope of extradition crimes.1 5 8
Third, the Cotroni court recognized that extradition is a necessary ele-
ment of justice. 159 The state where a crime has allegedly been committed
has a unique interest in seeing its own laws respected and enforced. 160
Further, its superior access to evidence and witnesses 16 1 increases the like-
lihood of achieving a just result. While "justice" may sound no less
broadly rhetorical than "shocks the conscience," its use here is actually
precise. It is the societal interest in having the requesting state determine
the fugitive's guilt or innocence in accordance with the laws allegedly
violated.162
Fourth, the nature of the requesting state's political and criminal jus-
tice systems is also significant in deciding whether a surrender is just
within the meaning of section 7, and whether judicial intervention in an
extradition order might be warranted. 163 As the Kindler court stated: "In
both Pennsylvania and California the legal system is the product of demo-
cratic government, and includes the substantial protections of a constitu-
tional rights document which dates back over two centuries." 16 4 This
factor will always clearly support the surrender of fugitives to the United
States.1 65
Finally, the presence of an extradition treaty with the requesting state
supports a showing of deference to the judgment of the executive for two
reasons. First, an extradition treaty may obligate the surrender of a fugitive
when its terms are met. The Extradition Treaty imposes such a requirement
upon the United States and Canada. 166 Second, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that the very existence of such a treaty is evidence of the
fact that the contracting states found each other's criminal justice systems
158. See id.
159. "[The] objectives [of extradition] go beyond that of suppressing crime.., and
include bringing fugitives to justice for the proper determination of their guilt or inno-
cence." United States v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d 193, 216-17 (Can. 1989).
160. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying note 20.
162. Cf. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d at 216-217.
163. "[Tlhe question is whether the provision or action in question offends the Cana-
dian sense of what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind... the foreign justice system
... " Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 492.
164. Id. at 494.
165. The court's assumption-that a constitutional democracy will show greater
respect for a fugitive's rights than a state which is either undemocratic, lacking constitu-
tional protections for individuals, or both-is almost certainly correct. The political and
criminal justice systems of two states seeking to impose identical punishments upon
identical fugitives may seem irrelevant to section 7. However, section 7 is not solely
focused on punishment, but rather is concerned with the justice or injustice of a surren-
der given the totality of the circumstances. See supra text accompanying note 133.
166. "Each Contracting Party agrees to extradite to the other, in the circumstances
and subject to the conditions described in this Treaty ...." The Extradition Treaty,
supra note 56, art. 1. This obligation has been recognized by the Supreme Court of
Canada: "Canada is under an international obligation to surrender a person accused of
having committed a crime listed in an extradition treaty if it meets the requirements of
the treaty ...." Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.3d at 226.
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sufficiently acceptable to enter into a binding treaty. 167 Thus, the Extradi-
tion Treaty establishes at least a presumption that the Canadian surrender
of a fugitive to the United States will not be fundamentally unjust.
D. What Is Fundamental Justice?
Kindler provides perhaps the clearest indication as to what does not violate
fundamental justice. Despite Canada's near-ban on the death penalty,168
the fact that Canada has not executed a criminal since 1962,169 Canada's
absolute treaty right to condition Kindler's surrender upon U.S. assurances
that he would not be put to death,170 and the strong possibility that Kin-
dler would be put to death in Pennsylvania, 171 the Supreme Court of Can-
ada ruled that his unconditional surrender would not violate fundamental
justice. 172 The court's refusal to prevent Kindler's surrender would seem
to preclude the successful invocation of section 7 by almost any fugitive.
V. United States v. Jamieson
In Jamieson, the Quebec Court of Appeal considered "whether the Minis-
ter's decision to surrender [Jamieson] violates the principles of fundamen-
tal justice within the meaning of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms." 173 The court hinged the resolution of this issue on two factors:
the manner in which the Minister made the surrender decision, and
whether the Minister's decision "respects the governing legal principles
and rests on a reasonable appreciation of the relevant facts and circum-
stances."'174 The court concluded that the surrender order was procedur-
ally sound 175 but nevertheless substantively flawed. 176 Thus, it granted
Jamieson's habeas petition and set aside the Minister's surrender order. 177
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Canada simply cited the Quebec panel's
dissent. 178. This Part summarizes the procedural posture of Jamieson,
explains the Quebec court's rationale, criticizes Judge Fish's majority opin-
ion for the Quebec court, and concludes by assessing Jamieson's impact
upon Canadian extradition law.
167. See Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 40.
168. See Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 493-494 (Can. 1991). See also, John
Burns, With Death at Issue, Can Canada Wash Its Hands?, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at A4
("Canada carried out its last executions in 1962 and formally abolished the death pen-
alty in 1976 ... ").
169. See Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 493; Bums, supra note 190, at A4.
170. See The Extradition Treaty, supra note 56, art. 6.
171. The jury that convicted Kindler recommended the imposition of the death pen-
alty, but Kindler escaped before sentencing. See Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 485.
172. See id. at 496.
173. United States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 271 (Que. Ct. App. 1994).
174. Id. at 273.
175. See id. at 276. Section 7's procedural character is described at supra Part W.B.
176. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 277-86.
177. See id. at 286.
178. See United States v. Jamieson, 104 C.C.C. 575 (Can. 1996).
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A. Procedural Posture of Jamieson
After Jamieson's arrest in Montreal, Superior Court Judge Ducros con-
ducted an extradition hearing in which he issued a warrant for Jamieson's
committal under section 18 of the Extradition Act.1 79 Jamieson then
applied for a writ of habeas corpus under section 19 of the Act, arguing
inter alia that his committal for extradition was in violation of sections 7
and 12 of the Charter.180 Superior Court Judge Pinard dismissed this
application in Jamieson v. Warden of Parthenais.'8 ' The Quebec Court of
Appeal affirmed this dismissal by a 2-1 vote in United States v. Jamieson, 1
82
and the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear an appeal.
18 3
After reviewing the record and written submissions, and meeting with
Jamieson's counsel, Justice Minister Campbell informed Jamieson that she
would surrender him to American authorities for trial.18 4 Jamieson again
applied for habeas corpus relief, challenging the Minister's surrender deci-
sion under section 7 of the Charter.' 8 5 Superior Court Judge Maynard
rejected this appeal in United States v. Jamieson.'8 6 Assuming that Jamie-
son would be sentenced to a twenty year minimum term of imprisonment
without parole, Maynard reasoned the conscience of the "average informed
Canadian" would not be so shocked as to prohibitJamieson's surrender.1
8 7
Maynard also considered such factors deterring drug traffickers from com-
ing to Canada, the non-arbitrariness of the Michigan sentence, the impor-
tance of preventing "hard drug" trafficking, and the need to show sufficient
deference to the Justice Minister's decision.' 8 8
An appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal followed, with the court find-
ing by a 2-1 margin that section 7 of the Charter barred Jamieson's surren-
der.' 8 9 Upon an appeal by the government, however, the Supreme Court of
Canada reversed in a ruling noteworthy, at the very least, for its concise-
ness. In its entirety, it reads: "Essentially, for the reasons given by
Baudouinj.A., the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is
set aside and the decision of the Superior Court dismissing the application
for habeas corpus is restored. Appeal allowed." 190
179. See United States v. Jamieson, S.C.M. 500-27-015433-909 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1990).
180. SeeJamieson v. Warden of Parthenais, S.C.M. 500-36-000019-912 (Que. Sup. Ct.
1991). Section 12 of the Charter, supra note 9, prohibits "cruel or unusual" punishment.
181. SeeJamieson, S.C.M. 500-36-000019-912.
182. See United States v. Jamieson, 73 C.C.C. 3d 460 (Que. Ct. App. 1992).
183. See S.C.C. 22879, June 11, 1992.
184. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 273-75.
185. See id. at 276.
186. See United States v. Jamieson, S.C.M. 500-36-000086-937 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1993).
187. See id. See supra Part V.C.2 for a criticism of the second Quebec panel majority's
use of an "informed" Canadian conscience.
188. SeeJamieson, S.C.M. 500-36-000086-937.
189. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C. 3d at 268-71.
190. United States v. Jamieson, 104 C.C.C.3d 575 (Can. 1996). The Supreme Court
of Canada also decided two companion cases with Jamieson. Notably, however, in each
of those cases the fugitive's habeas appeal had been rejected by the provincial appellate
court. See United States v. Whitley, 94 C.C.C.3d 99 (Ont. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd 132
D.L.R.4th 383 (Can. 1996) (holding that the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender
the fugitive, a drug "king pin" wanted for the large-scale importation of marijuana from
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B. The Jamieson Rationale
The Jamieson majority opinion written by Judge Fish echoes the language
of Schmidt and Kindler. The reviewing court "may neither usurp the discre-
tionary authority of the Minister, nor subject foreign legislative choices to
Canada's domestic constitutional requirements."19 1 Further, the court
acknowledges that courts must show deference to the Minister because the
Minister must consider issues of comity, reciprocity, treaty obligations,
and Canada's security interests. 19 2 This having been said, the court hardly
mentions these issues again, 193 focusing upon the appropriate constitu-
tional standard of review and the harshness of the sentence faced by
Jamieson.
1. Section 7 and the Standard of Review
Judge Fish employs the same section 7 rhetorical tools as the Supreme
Court of Canada. The surrender of a fugitive violates section 7 if it "shocks
the conscience" 194 or is incompatible with "the Canadian sense of what is
fair, right and just."395 Judge Fish refines this section 7 inquiry in light of
the section 12 prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, arguing
that "while s. 12 does not in itself provide a sufficient basis for quashing
the Minister's action, it is certainly relevant to a determination under s.
7."196 He concluded that the section 7 and 12 tests are essentially the
the United States into Canada, did not violate the fugitive's section 6 and 7 rights,
despite the fact that the fugitive faced a minimum 20 year sentence of imprisonment);
Ross v. United States, 93 C.C.C.3d 500 (B.C. Ct. App. 1994) affd 132 D.L.R.4th 575
(Can. 1996) (holding that the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender a fugitive Cana-
dian citizen who attempted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine in the United States for
importation into Canada did not violate the Charter's section 6 or 7 guarantees where
the fugitive faced a minimum 15 year prison sentence in Florida, but with the possibility
of release after 6 years). The lower courts in both Whitley and Ross distinguished Jamie-
son on its facts. Whitley, 94 C.C.C.3d at 119 (distinguishing Jamieson on the basis of
Jamieson's relative innocence as compared to Whitley); Ross, 93 C.C.C.3d at 578 (dis-
sent) (distinguishing cases on the basis of the fugitives' citizenship-Ross is Canadian,
Jamieson American); id. at 532 (majority opinion) (distinguishing cases on the basis
thatJamieson faced a much longer minimum sentence). The reactions of these courts-
three judges distinguish Jamieson on three entirely different grounds-suggest to this
author that the Jamieson decision was not itself persuasive.
191. United States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 277.
192. See id.
193. Given that none of these factors could possibly support its decision, the court's
silence is not surprising.
194. "[W]here the nature of the criminal procedures or penalties in a foreign country
sufficiently shocks the conscience as to make a decision to surrender a fugitive for trial
there one that breaches the principles of fundamental justice enshrined in s. 7." Jamie-
son, 93 C.C.C.3d at 278, quoting Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39-40 (Can.
1987).
195. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 280, quoting Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 491
(Can. 1991).
196. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 279. This statement finds support in Supreme Court
of Canada jurisprudence. In resolving a section 7 inquiry, "the values emanating from s.
12 play an important role in defining fundamental justice." Id. at 279, quoting Kindler,
84 D.L.R.4th at 446. See also id. at 490 ("Section 12 may affect the interpretation of s.7
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same.19 7
In defining the Canadian conscience, Judge Fish turns to "the average,
informed Canadian."198 His test, then, is whether the average, informed
Canadian would find Jamieson's surrender shocking to their conscience, in
light of either the section 7 guarantee of fundamental justice or the section
12 prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. This test represents
the limit of Judge Fish's section 7 analysis.
2. Jamieson's Sentence
For the purposes of his constitutional analysis, Judge Fish argues that Jam-
ieson will receive at least the full twenty-year minimum sentence, with no
chance for parole. 19 9 He concludes that the Minister's surrender order is
unconstitutional solely in light of this sentence:
[T]he situation faced by appellant on a trial in Michigan for trafficking in
273 grams of a mixture containing cocaine would shock the 'average,
informed' Canadian and.., the Minister's decision to surrender appellant
for that purpose would offend the "Canadian sense of what is fair, right and
just," even bearing in mind the "foreign justice system and considerations of
comity and security, and according due latitude to the Minister to balance
the conflicting considerations." 20 0
In making this conclusion, Judge Fish begins by considering Regina v.
... [b]ut s.12 is not the only factor to be considered in determining the constitutionality
of an extradition procedure.").
197. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 279-80. "I find strikingly similar the underlying
criterion approved in Smith for s. 12-whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive
as to outrage standards of decency... and the various tests laid down for s. 7 in extradi-
tion matters: 'shocks the conscience'...." Id.
198. Id. at 280.
199. See id. at 280-84. Judge Fish is most likely correct about Jamieson's sentence,
despite the fact that Jamieson's accomplice, David Schultz, received a much lesser sen-
tence. Schultz appealed his sentence of twenty to thirty-years imprisonment on the basis
that it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," People v. Schultz, 172 Mich. App.
674, 432 N.W.2d 742, 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). The Court of Appeals of Michigan
granted Schultz's appeal and remanded the case for resentencing. The court found
Schultz' sentence unconstitutional under the prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in the Michigan Constitution. See id.; MIcH. CONsr., art. 1, § 16. On remand,
the sentencing judge departed downward from the mandatory minimum and imposed a
sentence of four to thirty years. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 272. After being given
credit for time served, Schultz was released upon resentencing. See id.
Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that Jamieson would receive a sentencing depar-
ture below the twenty-year mandatory statutory minimum. Although Schultz was
charged with cocaine trafficking, he was only convicted of possession-a factor that was
relevant to the Michigan Court of Appeals when it set aside his sentence. Schultz, 432
N.W.2d at 747-48. More importantly, the Michigan Court of Appeals has greatly
restricted the grounds for a downward departure since Schultz' appeal. See People v.
Hill, 480 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Mich. 1991).
The Legislature appears to have spoken in a manner that indicates that
mandatory minimum sentences are required in order to rid society of the
scourge of drugs and that exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences should
be in only rare and exceptional cases where the original legislative purpose
would not be defeated.
Id.
200. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 280.
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Smith.201 In Smith, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a minimum
seven year sentence for the importation of narcotics into Canada because
its application in some cases might constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment under section 12 of the Charter. 202 While he concedes that section
12-and thus Smith-is not directly applicable to Jamieson because of the
prohibition of extraterritorial application of the Charter, 203 Judge Fish is
dearly using Smith as a benchmark for defining the Canadian conscience
vis-A-vis Jamieson when he argues that Michigan's twenty-year minimum
sentence would fail constitutional muster if imposed by the Canadian
government. 20 4
Judge Fish does consider the possibility of a split in public opinion.
I acknowledge that there are, in Canada, many people who would not find
the situation faced by appellant to be so shocking as to require judicial inter-
vention ... [but] it is my view that the majority of (though of course not all)
reasonably well-informed Canadians would consider that appellant faces a
situation in Michigan that shocks the conscience and is simply
unacceptable. 205
He reasons that a majority of Canadians would consider a twenty-year sen-
tence for Jamieson's crime to be "grossly disproportionate," "degrading to
human dignity," and severe beyond any "valid social aim."20 6 For this rea-
son, Judge Fish, with Judge Beauregard concurring, granted Jamieson's
habeas petition.
C. Criticism of the Quebec Court's Decision
Although Judge Fish cites the correct Supreme Court of Canada cases-in
particular, Schmidt and Kindler-he ignores them for all but rhetorical pur-
poses. While the Supreme Court of Canada case law does not provide a
bright-line rule for the application of section 7 to extradition proceedings,
it does prescribe a certain general approach. This section criticizes Judge
Fish's majority opinion in Jamieson for improperly collapsing sections 7
and 12 of the Charter; applying an impermissibly subjective 'shocks the
conscience' standard; failing to properly defer to the Minister of Justice;
and failing to consider the needs of an effective system of extradition.
1. The Collapse of Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter
While section 12 does not directly apply to extradition proceedings, 20 7 its
prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment may inform a proper section 7
201. Smith v. The Queen, 40 D.L.R.4th 435 (Can. 1987).
202. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 279.
203. See id. The issue of extraterritorial application of the Charter is explained at
supra Part lV.B.
204. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 279. Smith was arrested for attempting to import
7.5 ounces of cocaine, while Jamieson was arrested for attempting to sell 10 ounces of
cocaine. See id.
205. Id. at 284.
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying note 127.
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inquiry.20 8 The nature of the punishment faced-its cruelty or unusual-
ness-is one relevant factor in deciding whether the extradition of a fugitive
would be fundamentally unjust.20 9 While the Supreme Court of Canada
has not assigned section 12 a precise weight within this inquiry, Judge Fish
certainly exaggerates its importance by failing to give serious consideration
to values other than those implicated by section 12. That is, his statement
that the sentence faced by Jamieson violates section 7, "even bearing in
mind the foreign justice system and considerations of comity and security,
and according due latitude to the Minister to balance the conflicting con-
siderations" 210 is as much treatment as he gives those subjects. Given the
great weight that the Kindler court gave to considerations of comity and
security-even with a man's life at stake211-Judge Fish's analysis is inade-
quate. By ignoring all section 7 values that conflict with the section 12
prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment, he has violated the command
of the Kindler court that the courts not "apply sec. 12 directly to the act of
surrender."212
Additionally, Judge Fish confuses constitutional rhetoric with consti-
tutional law.213 He states that the "underlying criteria" sections 7 and 12
analyses are "substantially similar."214 This statement is incorrect.
Despite the Canadian courts' use of similar rhetorical devices to describe
sections 7 and 12,215 sections 7 and 12 implicate very different issues.
First, they focus upon different objects. Section 12 is solely concerned
with the punishment faced by an offender, as in the seven-year minimum
sentence in Smith.216 Section 7 focuses upon the Minister of Justice's exer-
cise of discretion in light of factors including-but not limited to--the sever-
ity of punishment faced by the fugitive.2 17 Thus, considerations of comity
and security are relevant and important to section 7 but not to section 12.
208. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
209. "[T]he question is whether the provision or action in question offends the Cana-
dian sense of what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind the nature of the offense and
the penalty ...." Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 492 (Can. 1991)
210. United States v. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 280 (punctuation omitted).
211. For the facts of Kindler, see supra text accompanying note 137-39.
212. Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 489.
213. This author would argue that constitutional rhetoric is language such as "shocks
the conscience" or "the Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just": it does not tell
courts how to decide cases, but rather serves as a verbal bridge between the even vaguer
language of specific constitutional provisions and the eventual constitutional law. Con-
stitutional law decides cases, or at least describes why a case was decided in a particular
manner. In the extradition context it includes factors such as comity, suppression of
crime, the penalty faced by the fugitive, etc.-issues that may be scrutinized by the courts
with some appearance of objectivity.
214. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 279-280.
215. E.g., "shocks the conscience," "simply unacceptable," etc. There is no intelligible
way to distinguish which of these quotes refers to section 7, which to section 12. See
supra Part IV.C.1 for a general discussion of the rhetoric of section 7.
216. Discussed at text accompanying supra notes 201-04.
217. See supra Part IV.C.2 and note 196 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly rejected the
notion that there is an equivalence between the systems of criminal justice
and extradition:
While the extradition process is an important part of our system of criminal
justice, it would be wrong to equate it to the criminal trial process. It differs
from the criminal process in purpose and procedure and, most importantly,
in the factors which render it fair. Extradition procedure, unlike the crimi-
nal procedure, is founded on the concepts of reciprocity, comity and respect
for differences in other jurisdictions.218
Judge Fish's collapse of section 7 into section 12 ignores these distinctions,
and fails to treat Michigan's sentencing regime in the proper manner. That
is, Judge Fish failed to treat it as one of several factors relevant to the consti-
tutionality of the Minister's decision.
2. Reliance upon an "Informed" Canadian Conscience
The Kindler court explained the rationale for appealing to the public con-
science: "In determining whether.., the extradition in question is 'simply
unacceptable,' the judge must avoid imposing his or her own subjective
views on the matter, and seek rather to assess objectively the attitudes of
Canadians .... -2 19 The Jamieson court, however, presents as public opin-
ion its subjective opinion that Jamieson's extradition would be
unconscionable.
Kindler cites public opinion polls, "persistent calls to bring back the
death penalty," the relatively recent abolition of the death sentence, and
close parliamentary votes on the issue as indications of the unclear state of
public opinion regarding the death penalty.220 The only sources that
Judge Fish cites to support his argument that Jamieson's extradition is
abhorrent to the Canadian conscience are judicial opinions concerning
purely domestic criminal issues.221 But even judicial opinion on the pre-
cise issue in Jamieson was evenly divided when Judge Fish wrote his opin-
ion: counting both Quebec Court of Appeal Jamieson decisions, the court
has split three to three as to whether Jamieson's extradition violates funda-
mental justice.222 As Rothman,J.A., stated for the first panel of the Quebec
Court of Appeal:
There are, of course, striking differences between our penalties for these
offences and those provided under the laws of Michigan. But even with
218. See Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 488.
219. See id. at 492.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
221. SeeJamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 284 (citing Regina v. Smith, 40 D.L.R.4th 435 (Can.
1987); Regina v. Miller, 70 D.L.R.3d 324 (Can. 1976)).
222. Both decisions were two-to-one. Concurring in United States v. Ross, 93
C.C.C.3d 500 (B.C. Ct. App. 1994), Judge Finch directly addressed Jamieson on these
terms:
So in the same case, in the same province, in the same court, there are three
judges on each side of the question .... When judges hold contrary, but rea-
soned, views on such a question, I am unable to understand how it can be said
that the foreign law is shocking, outrageous, or simply unacceptable.
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these differences, I do not believe that the Michigan sentences are so shock-
ing and unjust as to offend the principles of fundamental justice, requiring
us to refuse to surrender a fugitive facing trial in that state.
2 23
Judge Baudoin, dissenting from Judge Fish's majority opinion, goes even
further, characterizing Michigan's drug laws as "severe, even very severe"
and "the reflection of a repressive philosophy,"22 4 and the American legal
system as "very repressive."2 25 Nevertheless, Judge Baudouin concedes
that "it is not for me to decide" whether Michigan's law is right or
wrong.2 26 Judge Fish failed to show such restraint.
The language that Judge Fish uses to describe the Canadian con-
science further calls into question his objectivity. He appeals to the "major-
ity of . . . reasonably well-informed Canadians" 22 7 and the "average,
informed Canadian. ' 22 8 The Kindler court referred to "attitudes," "the
social consensus," "attitudes of Canadians," and "Canadian attitudes,"
2 29
but never qualified its conception of the Canadian conscience with adjec-
tives such as "informed." What Judge Fish means by "informed Canadi-
ans" is not dear. What is clear is that "informed Canadians" are not
simply "Canadians"-there is a necessary exclusion of opinion. Judge
Fish's implicit rejection of some portion of Canadian opinion as unin-
formed is another indication thatJamieson is an opinion motivated by the
personal morality of a judge-precisely what Kindler sought to avoid.2 30
3. The Failure to Properly Defer to the Minister
Justice Minister Campbell cited the following rationales as relevant to her
decision to order Jamieson's surrender:23 1 Jamieson's offense was
"planned and calculated and involved a hard drug;" drug trafficking is a
"very serious problem" in North America; the United States and Michigan
Constitutions provide their own protections against cruel or unusual pun-
ishments;23 2 the administration of criminal justice in the United States suf-
Id. at 554.
223. United States v. Jamieson, 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 469 (Que. Ct. App. 1992). Of
course, the first panel was not scrutinizing the Minister's surrender order, but Jamie-
son's committal (see supra text accompanying notes 112-15 for the relevance'of this dis-
tinction to Charter jurisprudence), and this statement by the firstJamieson panel is pure
dicta. Nevertheless, it seems as reasonable an assessment of the "Canadian conscience
as any other.
224. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 268.
225. Id. at 270.
226. See id. at 269.
227. Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 284
228. Id. at 286.
229. Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 493 (Can. 1991).
230. See id. at 492.
231. This explanation forJamieson's surrender is contained in a letter from the Minis-
ter ofJustice toJamieson explaining her surrender decision. SeeJamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d
at 273-75.
232. The nature of the legal system of the requesting country, the nature of its polit-
ical system, and the legal protections available to the fugitive upon his surrender all have
been relevant to the Supreme Court of Canada's extradition decisions. See supra Part
IV.C.2.
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ficiently reflects Canadian concepts of justice to warrant the maintenance
of the current extradition Treaty;2 3 Jamieson will have the opportunity to
argue for a downward departure from the twenty-year minimum sen-
tence; 234 Michigan's legislature is democratically elected; the imposition of
such a stiff sentence is in response to Michigan's drug problems, which are
much more serious than Canada's; Canada is a party to multilateral con-
ventions that enhance "Canada's commitment to extradite those charged
with drug offenses; '23 5 and finally, Canada could become a safe haven for
those charged with crimes similar to Jamieson's if it refused to extradite
Jamieson. The proper role of the Jamieson court was to determine whether
the Justice Minister's decision to surrender Jamieson was adequately justi-
fied by these rationales.23 6
The Jamieson court's response to the Minister's explanations is essen-
tially limited to:
The more difficult question is whether extradition violates Jamieson's sub-
stantive right, under s. 7, not to be deprived of his liberty except in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice. And that question fails to
be determined in accordance with the criteria established by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the cases referred to both by the Minister in her letter to
appellant and the trial judge in his reasons for judgment.2 37
However, the factors for which the Minister evidences a concern-deterring
fugitive criminals from seeking refuge in Canada, the needs of an efficient
system of extradition, respect for the differences of other state's criminal
justice system, and Canada's international obligations-are precisely
among the "criteria established by the Supreme Court of Canada" for
deciding a section 7 extradition inquiry.23 8 Further, the Supreme Court of
Canada has consistently stressed the need for judicial deference to execu-
tive extradition orders.23 9 The Jamieson decision respects neither the gen-
eral need for deference, nor the other criteria established by the court as
relevant to the section 7 inquiry.
This deference, however, is not to be absolute. The surrender of a fugi-
tive would be unconstitutional under section 7 if it were known that the
fugitive Fould be subject to torture upon his return to the requesting
233. See also COMMONS DEBATES, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 4781 (Can.) (Mr. George S.
Rideout), 4811 (Mrs. Beryl Gaffney), 4812 (Mr. Russell MacLellan) (1991) (generally
expressing approval with the U.S. justice system in the context of a proposed bill to
simplify Canadian extradition procedures).
234. However, a downward departure is extremely unlikely. See supra note 199.
235. These include the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961,
U.N.T.S 520/151/204; Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
March 25, 1972, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 63/8; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb.
21, 1971, U.N.T.S. 1019/175; Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/15.
236. As Judge Fish himself stated, "The role of the judiciary is confined to a review of
the executive decision for the sole purpose of ensuring its compliance with Canadian
constitutional standards." Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 277.
237. Id. (punctuation omitted).
238. See supra Part IV.C.2.
239. See supra note 77.
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state.240 Such a result would not be affected by the countervailing concern
of deferring to the Minister. 241 Nevertheless, the court reviewing a surren-
der order in that hypothetical case should not simply state that deference
is irrelevant to the section 7 inquiry, as the Jamieson court did. Rather,
deference is always relevant, even if outweighed by humanitarian concerns:
it simply reflects the fact that extradition is primarily a political act.242
4. The Failure to Consider the Needs of an Effective Extradition System
The value of extradition as a tool of crime control and a deterrent to fugi-
tive criminals depends upon how well the extradition process works.243
Over two hundred years of extradition history between the United States
and Canada have witnessed the institution of more and more liberal extra-
dition mechanisms.244 A key element of the current system is that the
requesting country need only make out a prima facie case that the fugitive
is extraditable for the extradition to take place. 245 The Schmidt court
described the role of the courts in the course of extradition proceedings:
The present system of extradition works because courts give the treaties a
fair and liberal interpretation with a view to fulfilling Canada's obligations,
reducing the technicalities of criminal law to a minimum and trusting the
courts in the foreign country to give the fugitive a fair trial, including such
matters as giving proper weight to the evidence and adequate consideration
of available defenses and the dictates of due process generally.246
Thus, extradition hearings are not to be transformed into full-blown crimi-
nal trials. 247
The Quebec court's Jamieson approach, however, ignored Schmidt and
would create unique legal and evidentiary difficulties for the extradition
system. Kindler provides a telling contrast. Justice Cory, dissenting in Kin-
dler, argued that "[t]he death penalty is per se a cruel and unusual punish-
ment."248 From Justice Cory's perspective, the Minister of Justice simply
cannot constitutionally surrender a fugitive who may be put to death.
Application of the rule in Jamieson, however, does not provide a clear
dichotomy between permissible and impermissible extraditions. Rather, it
stands for the "rule" that it is unconstitutional to surrender a first-time
240. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.l.4th 18, 39 (Can. 1987).
241. See id. at 39-40.
242. See supra note 77 and text accompanying supra note 146.
243. See supra text accompanying note 149-58.
244. See supra Part I.B.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
246. Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 41. See also COMMONs DEBAT s, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess.,
4813 (1991) (Can.) (Mr. Russell MacLellan):
We have an extradition agreement with the United States. That is the irony. We
trust the United States and it trusts us to treat cross-border refugees in a very
responsible manner. Yet we were keeping these two men [Kindler and Ng] for
six years. They were going from one appeal to the other ....
247. The Supreme Court of Canada has stressed the difference between extradition
and criminal proceedings. See supra text accompanying note 219.
248. Kindler, 84 D.L.R.4th at 481. See also supra text accompanying note 141.
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drug offender who faces a twenty-year minimum prison sentence with no
chance of parole for trafficking in ten ounces of cocaine.
Had the Kindler court adopted Justice Cory's view, the issue faced by a
habeas court in a Kindler-like situation would simply be whether the fugi-
tive faces the death penalty. Jamieson, however, produces a judicial quag-
mire. It requires the resolution of issues such as the sentence faced by the
fugitive, the fugitive's criminal history, the reprehensibility of the fugitive's
crime, and the likelihood that the sentencing court will depart downwards
from the minimum statutory punishment. This certainly cannot be recon-
ciled with the Schmidt command that Canadian judges trust foreign courts
to give the fugitive a fair trial.249 Further, nothing inJamieson suggests any
answer to the question: wouldJamieson's extradition still "shock the Cana-
dian conscience" if he faced a minimum sentence of only fifteen, ten, or
five years for the same crime?
In fact, close to one-half of the Jamieson majority's analysis involved
determining when a Michigan judge may depart downwards from the stat-
utory minimum sentence.250 This sort of searching inquiry into foreign
law is far beyond both the capability and the legal role of judges hearing
habeas petitions to surrender orders. There have always been qualitative
differences distinguishing those cases where extradition may be refused-
political offenses, 251 torture,25 2 double jeopardy253-from cases like Jamie-
son, where the constitutionality of the surrender order depends upon a
series of factual and legal deteminations that may be more complicated
than those involved in the actual criminal trial. 254
D. Canadian Extradition Law After Jamieson
Given its extradition jurisprudence, and particularly Kindler, the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision to permit Jamieson's extradition came as no
surprise. It was, in fact, predictable. This Note has argued that the court's
decision to permit Kindler's extradition practically precludes a successful
section 7 habeas petition from a surrender order.255 The court's cursory
249. See Schmidt, 39 D.L.th4th at 41.
250. See Jamieson, 93 C.C.C.3d at 280-84. That Canadian courts cannot adequately
understand the sentencing laws of fifty-one United States jurisdictions is apparent from
the fact that the Jamieson court never even addresses the possibility that corrections
officers often have means other than parole for significantly shortening the actual time
served by inmates, such as "good time" awards.
251. See supra Part II.C.
252. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly recognized this as a situation which
would make a surrender order unconstitutional under section 7 of the Charter. See
Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 39.
253. See supra Part II.C.
254. A criminal court must make a factual determination and then apply the criminal
law to those facts. In a case like Jamieson, the habeas court must roughly estimate this
outcome so that it may predict the punishment likely faced by the fugitive, and it must
do this under a body of foreign law and without the benefit of any of the witnesses or
evidence that would be present in a trial court. Then it must make a further decision: is
this hypothetical punishment grounds for constitutionally overriding a surrender order
by the executive?
255. See supra Part IV.C.
Vol. 30
1997 United States v. Jamieson
(it did not even hear oral arguments from the government, the appealing
party),256 unanimous disposition of Jamieson indicates that this is now a
closed issue. In an opinion only thirty-nine words in length, the court sim-
ply adopted the lower court's dissent as a rationale;257 its earlier extradi-
tion decisions had at least produced the sort of rhetorical flourishes that
might give an appellant hope.25 8 After Jamieson, only the most extraordi-
nary circumstances could produce a successful section 7 habeas appeal
from an extradition order, such as where a fugitive faces torture upon sur-
render. 259 Besides the possibility of a reversal of Kindler,260 which itself
would have no direct relevance to cases not involving the death penalty,261
section 7 of the Charter has become irrelevant to Canadian extradition law.
Conclusion
As a policy matter, the Supreme Court of Canada correctly decided Jamie-
son. Unreversed, the Quebec court's decision would have severely ham-
pered law enforcement efforts, particularly along the U.S.-Canadian border.
It would have encouraged the flight of American criminals into Canada,
providing them with at least the hope for immunity from serious U.S. crim-
inal prosecution. The Quebec court's visceral constitutional test would
have provided these same criminals, once captured, with enough legal
ammunition to wage a series of lengthy habeas corpus battles. Finally, it
would have crippled the ability of the Canadian executive to fulfill Canada's
treaty obligations, threatening the foundation of effective extradition rela-
tions, reciprocity.
Jamieson is also important as an affirmation of the sovereign authority
of the law. The Quebec court's decision is not unusual in its exploitation
of broad constitutiorial language, and its ultimately transparent substitu-
tion of judicial morality for that language. Not coincidentally, such
exploitation provides the courts with enormous power: the power to
almost arbitrarily define and redefine a constitution in the course of sub-
jecting laws or government action to constitutional review. By sharply
rejecting this approach, the Supreme Court of Canada has reasserted the
authority of the law over its interpreters.
256. The author personally observed the proceedings.
257. See supra text accompanying note 190. In even shorter opinions in companion
cases Ross and Whitley, the court cited the lower courts' rationales for approving of the
Minister's surrender orders. Ross v. United States, 132 D.L.R.4th 383 (Can. 1996);
Whitley v. United States, 132 D.L.R.4th 575 (Can. 1996).
258. See supra Part IV.C.1.
259. Cf. supra text accompanying note 133. Of course, it is unimaginable that the
Canadian Minister of Justice would surrender such a fugitive. It is also highly unlikely
that Canada would have an extradition treaty with a country that tortures criminals.
260. Such a possibility is not entirely unlikely: Kindler was decided by a five-to-four
vote. See Kindler v. Canada, 84 D.L.R.4th 498 (Can. 1991).
261. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 248-54 (arguing that the death penalty would
present different and discrete issues to a court on a habeas appeal than would non-death
penalty punishments).

